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The Problem with Sam Harris’ Moral Theory
The neuroscientist and podcaster says he found a way to derive morality from science—but it’s not that simple
In a famous passage of his 1738 Treatise of Human Nature, philosopher David Hume discussed an important distinction.
Hume observed of other books on ethics that “the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs” when a subtle but crucial shift occurs in their writing. These ethics authors move from speaking of “is, and is not” to speaking of “ought, or an ought not.” That is, they infer from facts about the world (what “is and is not”) that there is a right and wrong, or good or bad (what “ought or ought not” be).
Hume cannot see a way that a given set of facts can ever entail what is the right thing to do. He suggests that it “seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation [what you ought do], can be a deduction from others [what is and is not], which are entirely different from it.” There is a gap, Hume suggests, between normative conclusions — conclusions about what we should do, or what it would be right to do, or about whether certain states of affairs are good or just or otherwise valuable — and purely factual premises.
Subsequent philosophers have called this insight “the fact/value distinction” or “the is/ought gap.” Conflating these is sometimes called the “naturalistic fallacy.” The idea that the logical leap from “is” premises to “ought” conclusions is illegitimate has shaped the last few hundred years of philosophical discussion about morality.
In the last several years, however, the neuroscientist, political commentator, and podcaster Sam Harris has repeatedly argued that Hume was wrong. He suggests that you can, in fact, infer an “ought” from an “is.”
Harris promises the possibility of being able to conclude from facts about the world that there is indeed a right and…
